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UNITED STATES V. BRYANT AND THE SUBSEQUENT USE
OF UNCOUNSELED TRIBAL COURT CONVICTIONS
IN STATE OR FEDERAL PROSECUTION
Nicholas LeTang*
I. INTRODUCTION
The members of Montana’s seven tribal reservations share a troubling
truth when brought into tribal court: they may be sentenced to prison with-
out the guidance of counsel at trial. This is because tribal courts constitute
the only judicial forum in the United States where the Sixth Amendment
right to counsel does not apply.1 Under the Indian Civil Rights Act
(“ICRA”), tribes must provide indigent defendants with an attorney only
when imposing a prison sentence that is longer than one year.2 The absence
of full right to counsel protection seems less egregious when one considers
that tribal courts administer justice in accordance with tribal customs and
are heavily limited on the length of prison sentences they may impose.3
However, a major concern arises when uncounseled tribal convictions are
later introduced in a state or federal forum to satisfy elements of a criminal
statute. United States v. Bryant4 is a recent Montana case that demonstrates
the complexity of using uncounseled tribal convictions in a subsequent state
or federal prosecution.5
To date, the United States Supreme Court has not addressed whether
the Sixth Amendment bars the use uncounseled tribal convictions in a state
or federal prosecution.6 While it is clear that uncounseled tribal convictions
do not offend the Constitution at their inception,7 existing Court jurispru-
dence does not answer whether these convictions may be introduced in state
or federal forums without violating the Sixth Amendment. In the lower
courts, two competing arguments have emerged. The majority argument
holds that, since the Constitution does not apply to tribes, all uncounseled
tribal convictions that comply with ICRA are technically valid and their
* Nicholas LeTang, Candidate for J.D. 2017, Alexander Blewett III School of Law at the Univer-
sity of Montana. The author would like to thank Northern Cheyenne Chief Judge Ronie Rae Brady,
tribal prosecutor Calvin Wilson, and Professor Anthony Johnstone for their contributions. He would also
like to thank his parents, Myles and Ellen LeTang, for their support.
1. United States v. Kirkaldie, 21 F. Supp. 3d 1100, 1105 (D. Mont. 2014).
2. 25 U.S.C. § 1302(c) (2012).
3. Id. § 1302(b).
4. 769 F.3d 671 (9th Cir. 2014).
5. Id. at 673.
6. Id. at 676.
7. Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376, 384 (1896).
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subsequent use may never invoke a constitutional violation. On the other
hand, the minority argument elevates the spirit of the Sixth Amendment and
concerns for the reliability of uncounseled tribal convictions over their tech-
nical validity, holding these convictions to be constitutionally infirm for use
in state or federal court. Of the circuit courts to hear this issue—the Eighth,
Ninth, and Tenth Circuit—the Ninth Circuit in Bryant is the only court to
disallow the use of these convictions in state or federal court.8
This note argues the Bryant court correctly applied unsettled Court
precedent on the issue by rejecting the technical validity argument, instead
focusing on the spirit of the Sixth Amendment and its core principle of
ensuring reliable convictions. Part II develops the arguments and recounts
the factual and procedural background of Bryant. Part III summarizes the
development of the law prior to Bryant. This section gives background on
ICRA’s limited right to counsel in tribal courts; discusses the Court’s key
right to counsel cases, including the Court’s Sixth Amendment guiding star
in Gideon v. Wainwright9; explains how lower courts have decided the Bry-
ant issue; and finishes with background on the recidivist statute, 18 U.S.C.
§ 117. Part IV explains why Bryant was correct to distinguish the prosecu-
tion’s key authority in Nichols v. United States10 and instead focus on
Gideon-type concerns for the reliability of Bryant’s uncounseled tribal con-
victions. Part IV discusses Bryant’s criticisms. Finally, Part V offers a con-
clusion urging the Supreme Court to take on the Bryant issue and follow its
guiding star in Gideon by affirming Bryant.
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND OF
UNITED STATES V. BRYANT
Michael Bryant, Jr., a member of the Northern Cheyenne Indian Reser-
vation, was charged with two counts of domestic assault in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 117 in United States District Court in Montana.11 A federal recidi-
vist statute, § 117 targets repeat domestic assault offenders in special mari-
time, territorial, and tribal jurisdictions.12 Section 117 requires at least two
prior domestic assault convictions.13 The prosecution relied on two prior
domestic assault convictions that were obtained in Northern Cheyenne Tri-
8. Bryant, 769 F.3d at 679.
9. 372 U.S. 335, 345 (1963).
10. 511 U.S. 738 (1994).
11. Bryant, 769 F.3d at 673.
12. 18 U.S.C. § 117(a) (2012).
13. Id.
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bal Court in Lame Deer, Montana.14 Both of these convictions were un-
counseled.15 At least one of the convictions resulted in prison time.16
Bryant filed a motion to dismiss the indictment in district court, claim-
ing the use of his uncounseled tribal convictions would violate the Sixth
Amendment.17 The district court denied his motion.18 Bryant subsequently
entered a conditional guilty plea but preserved his right to appeal the district
court’s ruling on his motion to dismiss.19 The court sentenced Bryant to two
concurrent 46 month terms for his two § 117 domestic abuse counts.20 He
appealed his conviction to the Ninth Circuit.21
A. The Parties’ Arguments on Appeal
1. Bryant’s Argument
Bryant argued that using his prior convictions to establish guilt under
§ 117 violated the Constitution because, had they been obtained in state or
federal court, those convictions would have violated his Sixth Amendment
right to counsel.22 Essential to Bryant’s argument is the fact that at least one
of his uncounseled tribal court convictions resulted in prison time.23 Bryant
did not argued his tribal convictions were unconstitutional merely because
he was uncounseled; Bryant was aware that the Sixth Amendment does not
apply to tribal court proceedings.24 Instead, Bryant argued his convictions
were constitutionally infirm for use in federal court.25 At the core of Bry-
ant’s argument is the reliability of convictions obtained without the benefit
of counsel.
2. The Prosecution’s Argument
The prosecution began its argument with the premise that the Sixth
Amendment did not apply to Bryant’s tribal court proceedings.26 Built on
this premise, the prosecution concluded Bryant’s convictions were per se






20. Bryant, 769 F.3d at 673.
21. Id.
22. Opening Brief of Defendant-Appellant, United States v. Bryant, 2012 WL 3911734 at *10
(C.A.9 Aug. 31, 2012) (No. 12-30177).
23. Bryant, 769 F.3d at 673.
24. Opening Brief of Defendant-Appellant, supra note 22, at *8. R
25. Id. at *14. Bryant, 769 F.3d at 673.
26. Brief of Appellee United States, United States v. Bryant, 2012 WL 5915328 at *8 (C.A.9 Nov.
15, 2012) (No. 12-30177).
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valid under the Constitution for subsequent use in federal court.27 As per se
valid, any subsequent Sixth Amendment concerns for these convictions
were foreclosed.28 This argument is categorical in nature: because Bryant’s
convictions were valid at inception under the Constitution, the later use of
these convictions cannot implicate the Sixth Amendment. The prosecution
relied on the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Nichols29 to sup-
port its argument that uncounseled tribal convictions may never invoke a
Sixth Amendment violation.30 At the core of the prosecution’s argument is
the technical validity of uncounseled tribal convictions.
B. The Unanimous Opinion
In a unanimous decision, the three-judge panel dismissed the § 117
charges against Bryant. The court reasoned that, because Bryant’s uncoun-
seled tribal convictions would have violated the Sixth Amendment had they
been obtained in state or federal court, using them to establish an element of
an offense in a subsequent prosecution was constitutionally impermissi-
ble.31 Under the Ninth Circuit’s rule, tribal convictions may be used in a
subsequent state or federal prosecution only if the tribal court provided full
Sixth Amendment protection.32 This rule reaffirmed a Sixth Amendment
safeguard first established by the Ninth Circuit in United States v. Ant33 that
looked beyond the initial validity of uncounseled tribal convictions and re-
viewed the tribal proceedings to determine if they conformed with Constitu-
tional requirements.34
To reach its holding, the court distinguished Nichols35 and determined
instead that Ant applied.36 Bryant’s incarceration upon at least one of his
tribal convictions was the determinative fact.37 Nichols did not apply be-
cause it involved a prior conviction that did not involve incarceration,
which comported with the Sixth Amendment.38 The court further explained
that, even after Nichols, uncounseled convictions that resulted in imprison-
ment could not be used in subsequent state or federal prosecutions.39 Upon
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Nichols, 511 U.S. at 748–749.
30. Brief of Appellee United States, supra note 26, *4. R
31. Bryant, 769 F.3d at 677.
32. Id.
33. 882 F.2d 1389 (9th Cir. 1989).
34. Id.
35. Nichols, 511 U.S at 748–749.
36. Bryant, 769 F.3d at 677.
37. Id. at 679.
38. Id. at 677.
39. Id.
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distinguishing Nichols, the court determined that the Sixth Amendment
safeguard stated in Ant prohibited the use of Bryant’s tribal convictions in
federal court.40 Thus, the district court’s denial of Bryant’s motion to dis-
miss his indictment had to be reversed.41
C. Judge Watford’s Concurring Opinion
Though agreeing that the Ninth Circuit’s precedent in Ant controlled,
Judge Watford stated his reasons for why Ant needed reexamination.42
First, he felt Nichols called Ant’s reasoning into question.43 Specifically,
Judge Watford felt that Nichols demonstrated the Court deemphasizing con-
cerns for the reliability of uncounseled convictions.44 His second reason
was the impact Ant had on the integrity of tribal courts.45 Judge Watford
thought that questioning the reliability of uncounseled tribal convictions
denigrated the integrity of tribal courts.46 He further stated that uncounseled
tribal court proceedings should not be viewed as inherently suspect,47 and
respect for the integrity of an independent sovereign’s courts should pre-
clude quick judgments against Bryant’s prior convictions.48
III. DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAW PRIOR TO UNITED STATES V. BRYANT
A. The Limited Right to Counsel in Tribal Court
Defendants in tribal court receive a limited right to counsel that is not
derived from the Sixth Amendment. The Court has long considered Indian
tribes as domestic dependent nations that, although not possessing full sov-
ereignty, are capable of regulating their own internal and social affairs.49
Under this doctrine of tribal self-determination, the Court in Talton v.
Mayes50 determined tribes are not constrained by the Bill of Rights, includ-
ing the right to counsel.51 In the wake of the Civil Rights Movement in the
later 1960s, Congress passed IRCA to address perceived civil rights viola-
40. Id.at 679.
41. Id.
42. Bryant, 769 F.3d at 679–681 (Watford, J., concurring).
43. Id. at 679–680.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 680.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Bryant, 769 F.3d at 680 (Watford, J., concurring).
49. Talton, 163 U.S. at 384.
50. 163 U.S. 376 (1896)
51. Id. at 384.
5
LeTang: Uncounseled Tribal Court Convictions in Federal Prosecutions
Published by ScholarWorks at University of Montana, 2016
\\jciprod01\productn\M\MON\77-1\MON108.txt unknown Seq: 6  9-FEB-16 12:57
216 MONTANA LAW REVIEW Vol. 77
tions occurring in tribal courts.52 However, instead of providing full right to
counsel protection equal to the Sixth Amendment, ICRA affords tribal de-
fendants a limited statutory right.53 Under this limited right, indigent de-
fendants are entitled to full right to counsel protection only when tribes seek
to impose a prison sentence longer than one year;54 otherwise, tribal de-
fendants facing prison sentences of one year or less have a right to counsel
only at the defendant’s expense.55 This one-year gap in equal right to coun-
sel protection is the source of the issue underlying Bryant.
B. The Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel
In 1963, the landmark case Gideon v. Wainwright expanded the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel to state courts.56 Clarence Gideon was charged
in Florida state court with felony breaking and entering a poolroom with
intent to commit a misdemeanor.57 His requests for court-appointed counsel
ended with a sympathetic denial by the state court,58 to which Gideon
boldly responded, “The United States Supreme Court says I am entitled to
be represented by Counsel.”59 Indeed, the Court would rule in Gideon’s
favor nearly two years later.60
The Court’s focus in Gideon was on the fairness and reliability of un-
counseled convictions.61 At trial, Gideon represented himself “as well as
could be expected from a layman.”62 Nonetheless, the Court recognized an
imbalance existed in our adversarial justice system.63 To the Court, even
intelligent and educated laymen are no match to governments that “spend
vast sums of money to establish machinery to try defendants accused of
crime.”64 The Court thought this imbalance threatened our nation’s noble
ideal of conducting fair trials in which every defendant stands equal before
the law, writing:
[R]eason and reflection require us to recognize that in our adversary system
of criminal justice, any person haled into court, who is too poor to hire a
52. Samuel D. Newton, Note, Reliability, That Should Be the Question: The Constitutionality of
Using Uncounseled Tribal Court Convictions in Subsequent Federal Trials After Ant, Cavanaugh, and
Shavanaux, 36 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 489, 499 (2012).
53. 25 U.S.C. § 1302(c).
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Gideon, 372 U.S. at 345.
57. Id. at 336.
58. Id. at 337.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 345.
61. Id. at 344–345.
62. Gideon, 372 U.S. at 337.
63. Id. at 344.
64. Id.
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lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial unless counsel is provided for him. This
seems to us to be an obvious truth.65
Closer to its point on reliability, the Court warned that uncounseled defend-
ants could be put on trial without a proper charge or convicted upon evi-
dence that may be incompetent, irrelevant, or inadmissible.66 Further, the
Court asserted that defendants alone lack the skill and knowledge to ade-
quately prepare a defense and establish their innocence.67 Faced with these
concerns, expanding Sixth Amendment protection to state court proceed-
ings was necessary to insuring the fundamental rights of life and liberty.68
With Gideon as its guiding principle, the Court later clarified when a
defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel is violated. In Scott v. Illi-
nois,69 the Court determined an indigent defendant’s right to counsel is not
violated unless the defendant’s uncounseled conviction results in prison
time.70 Scott clarifies that a defendant’s right to counsel is not violated
merely because counsel was not provided at trial. Instead, the Sixth Amend-
ment is violated only upon an uncounseled defendant’s imprisonment.71
The Court recognized actual deprivation of liberty is a substantially differ-
ent penalty than a fine or the mere threat of imprisonment.72 As a result,
imprisonment became the Court’s bright line to define when a defendant’s
Sixth Amendment right to counsel has been violated.73
C. The Supreme Court and the Subsequent Use of Uncounseled
Convictions
After Gideon but before Scott, the Court determined a line of cases that
established its general rule barring the use of uncounseled convictions in
subsequent prosecutions.74 Included in this line of cases is Burgett v.
Texas,75 the Court’s seminal case on the use of uncounseled convictions to
fulfill an element of a recidivist statute. In Burgett, the prosecution submit-
ted the defendant’s multiple uncounseled convictions into evidence at
trial.76 The Court reversed the defendant’s conviction, reasoning that to al-
low prior convictions obtained in violation of Gideon to support an element
65. Id.
66. Id. at 345.
67. Id. at 345.
68. Gideon, 372 U.S. at 343.
69. 440 U.S. 367 (1979).
70. Id. at 373–374.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 373.
73. Id. at 373–374.
74. Burgett v. Texas, 389 U.S. 109, 115 (1967); United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 447 (1972);
Loper v. Beto, 405 U.S. 473, 476 (1972).
75. 389 U.S. 109 (1967).
76. Id. at 118.
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of a recidivist statute is to erode the principles of [Gideon].”77 Furthermore,
by allowing an uncounseled conviction to be used at a subsequent trial, the
defendant “suffer[s] anew” from the earlier absence of counsel.78
Though the general rule is that the Sixth Amendment bars the subse-
quent use of uncounseled convictions, the Court identifies two exceptions,
only one of which is relevant to the Bryant issue.79 The relevant exception
is found in United States v. Nichols.80 Nichols held that an uncounseled
misdemeanor conviction, valid under Scott because no prison term was im-
posed, may be used to enhance punishment in subsequent prosecution.81 In
Nichols, the sentencing court used an uncounseled misdemeanor DUI con-
viction to enhance the defendant’s sentence.82 The defendant argued that,
under the per curium decision in Baldasar v. Illinois,83 the prosecution
could not use an uncounseled conviction regardless of the fact that the de-
fendant was not imprisoned upon his DUI conviction.84 Recognizing the
confusion that resulted from its decision in Baldasar, the Court overruled
Baldasar and aligned the constitutionality of using uncounseled convictions
with its holding in Scott.85 Now, just as the Sixth Amendment right to coun-
sel is not violated unless an uncounseled defendant is imprisoned,86 prior
uncounseled convictions that did not result in imprisonment may be used to
enhance sentences.87
D. How Lower Courts Have Handled the Bryant Issue
Prior to Bryant, four courts had decided the Bryant issue, including
three circuit courts and the Montana Supreme Court.88 Of these four courts,
only the Ninth Circuit in Ant determined that the Sixth Amendment barred
the subsequent use of uncounseled tribal convictions.89 Ant would later be-
come the precedent for which Bryant relies upon.90
77. Id. at 115.
78. Id.
79. Lewis v. United States, 455 U.S. 55, 67 (1980); Nichols, 511 U.S. at 748–749.
80. Nichols, 511 U.S. at 748–749.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 740.
83. 446 U.S. 222, 228 (1980).
84. Nichols, 511 U.S. at 741.
85. Id. at 748–749.
86. Scott, 440 U.S. at 373–374.
87. Nichols, 511 U.S. at 748–749.
88. Ant, 882 F.2d at 1389; United States v. Cavanaugh, 643 F.3d 592, 604 (8th Cir. 2011); United
States v. Shavanaux, 647 F.3d 993, 998 (10th Cir. 2011); State v. Spotted Eagle, 71 P.3d 1239, 1245
(Mont. 2003).
89. Ant, 882 F.2d at 1396.
90. Bryant, 769 F.3d at 677.
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1. The Ninth Circuit
Ant was the first circuit court case to address the Bryant issue.91 Una-
ble to afford an attorney, the defendant in Ant lacked counsel when he pled
guilty to assault and battery in Northern Cheyenne Tribal Court.92 Later,
federal prosecutors introduced the defendant’s guilty plea as evidence of
guilt in a subsequent prosecution for manslaughter for the same crime.93
The Ninth Circuit reversed the conviction on appeal, reasoning that the tri-
bal court guilty plea was made under circumstances which would have vio-
lated the Sixth Amendment had it been obtained in federal court.94 When
evaluating the defendant’s tribal guilty plea under a hypothetical federal
court setting,95 Ant looked beyond the initial validity of the conviction and
reviewed the tribal proceedings to determine if they conformed with the
Sixth Amendment.96
2. The Montana Supreme Court and the Eighth and Tenth Circuit
When faced with the Bryant issue, the Montana Supreme Court and
the Eighth and Tenth Circuit all held that uncounseled tribal convictions
could be used in subsequent state or federal prosecutions.97 The technical
validity of tribal convictions was determinative to these courts.98 All three
declined follow Ant.99 The Montana Supreme Court further reasoned in
State v. Spotted Eagle100 that it was judicial policy in Montana to avoid
interfering with tribal courts, and that to disregard a valid tribal court con-
viction would “indirectly undermine the sovereignty” of Montana’s
tribes.101
E. The Restoring Safety to Indian Women Act
The Restoring Safety to Indian Women Act, 18 U.S.C. § 117, is the
catalyst for the Bryant issue. A federal recidivist statute, § 117 was the un-
derlying charge in each of the three circuit court cases that examined the
Bryant issue.102 Congress enacted § 117 to address domestic violence in
91. Ant, 882 F.2d at 1389.
92. Id. at 1390–1391.
93. Id. at 1391.
94. Id. at 1396.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Cavanaugh, 643 F.3d at 604; Shavanaux, 647 F.3d at 998; Spotted Eagle, 71 P.3d at 1245.
98. Cavanaugh, 643 F.3d at 604; Shavanaux, 647 F.3d at 998; Spotted Eagle, 71 P.3d at 1245.
99. Cavanaugh, 643 F.3d at 604; Shavanaux, 647 F.3d at 998; Spotted Eagle, 71 P.3d at 1244.
100. 71 P.3d 1239 (Mont. 2003).
101. Id. at 1245.
102. Cavanaugh, 643 F.3d at 604; Shavanaux, 647 F.3d at 997; Ant, 882 F.2d at 1396.
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Indian country.103 Passed in 2006, § 117 created a new federal offense to
impose harsher criminal punishment on repeat domestic violent offenders in
Indian country and to use tribal convictions for domestic violence for that
purpose.104 According to the Department of Justice’s Office on Violence
Against Women, Indian women report higher rates of domestic partner vio-
lence than women of any other ethnic or racial background.105 Since 2006,
Congress has passed three key pieces of legislation to address this issue.106
Of these three laws, § 117 is the primary tool used by the federal govern-
ment to address domestic violence in Indian country.107
Section 117 was a necessary extension of federal prosecutors’ ability
to charge domestic abusers in Indian country for two important reasons.
First, prior to § 117, federal prosecutors were restricted to handling felony-
level assault cases enumerated in the Indian Major Crimes Act.108 This
meant prosecutors were unable to charge repeat domestic violence offend-
ers absent substantial bodily harm to the victim.109 Second, ICRA restricts
tribes to imposing sentences of three years or less.110 Further, before a tribe
can impose a sentence longer that one year, the tribe must provide defend-
ants a right to counsel equal to the Sixth Amendment111 and adjudicate
these trials with a tribal judge who has “sufficient legal training to preside
over criminal proceedings”112 and is “licensed to practice law by any juris-
diction in the United States.”113 Because many tribal courts are significantly
underfunded and unable to afford full right to counsel protection for defend-
ants,114 tribal courts are fixed to imposing prison terms of one year or
less.115 With the passage of § 117, federal prosecutors now have the ability
to prosecute repeat domestic abusers and seek prison sentences significantly
longer than those available in tribal courts. In this way, § 117 fulfills Con-
gress’s goal of removing repeat domestic abusers from tribal reservations
and avoiding further violence to Indian women.
103. Jeana Petillo, Domestic Violence in Indian Country: Improving the Federal Government’s Re-
sponse to This Grave Epidemic, 45 CONN. L. REV. 1841 (2013).
104. 151 CONG. REC. S4873-74 (2005).
105. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE ON THE VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN, 2014 BIENNIAL REPORT TO
CONGRESS ON THE EFFECTIVENESS OF GRANT PROGRAMS UNDER THE VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN ACT
47 (2014).
106. Petillo, supra note 103, at 1862. R
107. Id. at 1862.
108. 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (2012).
109. Id.
110. 25 U.S.C. § 1302(b).
111. Id. § 1302(c)(2).
112. Id. § 1302(c)(3)(A).
113. Id. § 1302(c)(3)(B).
114. Id. § 3601
115. Id.
10
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IV. ANALYSIS
The Supreme Court has not addressed whether the Sixth Amendment
bars the use of uncounseled tribal convictions in a state or federal prosecu-
tion. It is clear Bryant’s uncounseled convictions would have violated the
Sixth Amendment if they had been obtained in state or federal court.116
Likewise, Court precedent in Burgett v. Texas would normally disallow the
introduction of Bryant’s convictions in federal court to fulfill an element of
a recidivist statute.117 However, Talton v. Mayes makes equally clear that
Bryant’s uncounseled convictions were constitutionally valid at their incep-
tion since the Sixth Amendment does not apply to tribal court proceed-
ings.118 Thus, Court precedent appears to label Bryant’s convictions as
technically valid at inception yet seemingly unconstitutional in substance
for subsequent use in state or federal court. In a maze of Sixth Amendment
and Indian law jurisprudence, there was no clear path for the Bryant court.
Faced with unclear Court precedent, the Ninth Circuit in Bryant was the
only circuit court to correctly reject Nichols and instead focus on the
Gideon-type concerns for the reliability of uncounseled tribal convictions.
A. Bryant Correctly Applied Unsettled Supreme Court Jurisprudence
In any event, the most we take from these cases is that Supreme Court
authority in this area is unclear; reasonable decision-makers may differ in
their conclusions as to whether the Sixth Amendment precludes a federal
court’s subsequent use of convictions that are valid because and only because
they arose in a court where the Sixth Amendment did not apply.
—Eighth Circuit in Cavanaugh119
The Bryant court correctly focused on the Gideon-type concerns for
the reliability of Bryant’s uncounseled tribal convictions when it held “tri-
bal court convictions may be used in subsequent prosecutions only if the
tribal court guarantees a right to counsel that is, at minimum, coextensive
with the Sixth Amendment right.”120 To support its reasoning, the court
needed to properly distinguish Nichols, which stood to undermine the Bry-
ant court’s focus on the reliability of Bryant’s uncounseled tribal convic-
tions.
116. Gideon, 372 U.S. at 345.
117. Burgett, 389 U.S. at 109.
118. Talton, 163 U.S at 384.
119. Cavanaugh, 643 F.3d at 605.
120. Bryant, 769 F.3d at 677.
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1. Inapplicability of the Nichol’s Valid Uncounseled Conviction
Exception
The Bryant court was correct to not be persuaded by the prosecution’s
flawed argument that Nichols should control Bryant’s case. In Nichols, the
Court held that a defendant’s prior uncounseled convictions may be used to
enhance a subsequent sentence if the convictions were valid under Scott.121
An uncounseled conviction is valid under Scott when the conviction did not
result in imprisonment.122 The prosecution argued a very broad reading of
Nichols when it asserted that “prior uncounseled convictions can be consid-
ered in subsequent criminal matters so long as the convictions do not in-
volve actual constitutional violations.”123 Recognizing constitutional pro-
tections do not apply in tribal court proceedings,124 the prosecution
stretched Nichols’s holding to make its technical validity argument. In do-
ing so, the prosecution neglected a key fact in Bryant’s case: unlike the
defendant in Nichols, Bryant was imprisoned as a result of his prior uncoun-
seled convictions.125
The prosecution’s use of Nichols stretches well beyond its context and
distorts the Court’s reasoning. The Court in Nichols created the exception
allowing the subsequent use of valid uncounseled convictions precisely be-
cause valid uncounseled convictions carry no prison time.126 The Nichols
exception is narrow, only reaching cases where personal liberty is not at
stake.127 The Court in Scott showed that convictions not imposing prison
sentences are categorically different from convictions resulting in imprison-
ment.128 Trials involving prison sentences are more involved and risk the
most valuable right our society offers: freedom. The key fact in Nichols was
that the defendant’s valid uncounseled DUI conviction did not result in im-
prisonment.129 Unlike the defendant in Nichols, Bryant was imprisoned for
at least one of his prior uncounseled convictions.130 For the prosecution to
cite Nichols for the purpose of making its technical validity argument was
opportunistic and disregarded a key fact in Bryant’s case: his incarcera-
tion.131
121. Nichols, 511 U.S. at 748–749.
122. Id.
123. Brief of Appellee, supra note 26 at *9.
124. Id. at *8.
125. Bryant, 769 F.3d at 673.
126. Nichols, 511 U.S. at 748–749.
127. Newton, supra note 52, at 516.
128. Scott, 440 U.S. at 373–374.
129. Nichols, 511 U.S. at 748–749.
130. Bryant, 769 F.3d at 673.
131. Id.
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The Bryant court’s analysis should have further differentiated Nichols
by emphasizing that the Court in Nichols was deciding whether valid un-
counseled convictions could be used in the sentencing phase of the defen-
dant’s case, not the guilt phase.132 The sentencing phase is repeatedly rec-
ognized by the Court as “less exacting” than the process of establishing
guilt.133 For instance, when imposing a sentence, a judge may consider past
criminal behavior even if no conviction resulted from that particular crimi-
nal behavior.134 Unlike the defendant in Nichols, Bryant was not in the sen-
tencing phase of his case when the federal court considered his prior con-
victions.135 Instead, federal prosecutors used Bryant’s uncounseled convic-
tions to establish an element of § 117.136 Because the concerns for
reliability of past convictions are lessened during the sentencing phase—
where judges are at liberty to consider a wider range of criminal behavior—
the Bryant court should have further distinguished Nichols as inapplicable
to the adjudication of Bryant’s guilt. Even the Eighth Circuit in United
States v. Cavanaugh questioned the validity of Nichols under the same fac-
tual scenario as Bryant,137 despite holding that Nichols controlled.138 The
Eighth Circuit’s unease about applying Nichols was apparent in its majority
opinion: “It also seems clear that, where the subsequent use is to prove the
actual elements of a criminal offense, Nichols is of questionable applicabil-
ity, given the Court’s emphasis on the differences between sentencing and
guilt determination.”139
2. Guiding Principles of Gideon
Having reasoned that the Court’s exception to allowing the use of un-
counseled convictions in Nichols did not apply, the Bryant court was cor-
rect to apply its precedent in Ant.140 Despite being the only circuit court to
do so, Bryant correctly followed Gideon’s guiding principles of fairness and
reliability.141 In Gideon, the Court stated, “The right of one charged with
crime to counsel may not be deemed fundamental and essential to fair trials
in some countries, but it is in ours.”142 Allowing the subsequent use of
uncounseled tribal convictions in state or federal court ignores the fairness
132. Nichols, 511 U.S. at 747.
133. Id.
134. Cavanaugh, 643 F.3d at 601.
135. Bryant, 769 F.3d at 673.
136. Id.
137. Cavanaugh, 643 F.3d at 601.
138. Id. at 604.
139. Id. at 601.
140. Bryant, 769 F.3d at 677.
141. Id. at 678–679.
142. Gideon, 372 U.S. at 344.
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and reliability concerns that are inherent when indigent defendants do not
have the assistance of counsel. The Court in Gideon explained that the as-
sistance of counsel was fundamental to the interests of justice, writing, “The
Sixth Amendment stands as a constant admonition that if the constitutional
safeguard it provides be lost, justice will not still be done.”143 These words
stand as a warning that, by allowing uncounseled tribal convictions into
state or federal court based on their technical validity, justice will be lost.
B. The Bryant Decision: Criticisms and Their Rebuttals
Though the Bryant court correctly applied unclear Supreme Court ju-
risprudence, Bryant is not without valid criticisms. This section addresses
three criticisms, including: (1) Bryant’s reliance on vulnerable Ninth Circuit
precedent in United States v. Ant; (2) Bryant’s potential violation of tribal
sovereignty; and (3) Bryant’s omission of an analysis concerning whether
§ 117 violates the Fifth Amendment’s guarantee of equal protection.
1. Bryant Relies on Vulnerable Precedent in Ant
Arguments questioning the vitality of Ant are not without merit. Critics
may argue that to bypass the technical validity argument and attach a Sixth
Amendment violation, Ant must rely on a hypothetical: the defendant’s un-
counseled tribal conviction would have violated the Sixth Amendment had
it been obtained in state or federal court.144 This premise is vital to the
Ninth Circuit’s holding. Had the Ant court not considered the defendant’s
tribal conviction in a hypothetical nontribal setting, it would not have
reached a constitutional violation. Since Ant considers the defendant’s prior
conviction as existing outside of its true tribal court setting, its reasoning is
counterfactual.
As Ant demonstrates, articulating how a constitutional violation at-
taches during the subsequent use of an uncounseled tribal conviction is
problematic. The existing Sixth Amendment framework does not explain
how a Sixth Amendment violation can attach to uncounseled tribal convic-
tions that are constitutionally valid at inception. Current Court precedent
holds that a defendant’s right to counsel is invoked “at or after the time that
judicial proceedings have been initiated”145 and is not violated unless an
uncounseled defendant is convicted and imprisoned.146 Under this frame-
work, Bryant’s constitutional right to counsel was invoked and violated pre-
cisely at moments when the Constitution did not apply. By determining that
143. Id. at 343 (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 462 (1938)).
144. Ant, 882 F.2d at 1393.
145. Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 398 (1977).
146. Scott, 440 U.S. at 373–374.
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a constitutional violation would result from the subsequent use of Ant’s
tribal conviction, critics may argue that Ant impliedly read a Sixth Amend-
ment right into ICRA—a right that does not exist. For this reason, the Ninth
Circuit’s precedent in Ant is vulnerable. The vulnerability of Ant is apparent
when considering the Montana Supreme Court and the Eighth and Tenth
Circuits all declined to follow Ant.147 These courts determined the technical
validity of uncounseled tribal convictions was dispositive to the Bryant is-
sue.148 Since the technical validity of tribal convictions was determinative
to these courts, no analysis was done on Gideon-type concerns for reliabil-
ity.149
Although the reasoning seen in the Montana Supreme Court and the
Eighth and Tenth Circuits has merit, the Bryant court was correct to look
beyond the technical validity of Bryant’s tribal convictions and focus on the
Gideon-type concerns for reliability. Analyses solely focusing on the tech-
nical validity of uncounseled tribal convictions are deficient. A complete
Sixth Amendment analysis on the Bryant issue examines whether tribal
convictions obtained without counsel150 can be properly used in state and
federal courts without eroding the principle of Gideon.151 The technical va-
lidity of uncounseled tribal convictions is not a measure of their reliability,
and reliability is the touchstone of a Sixth Amendment analysis.152 Even the
Eighth Circuit in Cavanaugh noted that the absence of a reliability analysis
weakened its holding.153 The Eighth Circuit described its decision to focus
on the technical validity of uncounseled tribal convictions as “categorical in
nature rather than firmly rooted in the reliability concerns expressed in
Gideon.”154
The Bryant court was correct to not elevate form over substance when
considering the constitutionality of allowing Bryant’s convictions into fed-
eral court. Courts should not use the technical validity argument to turn a
blind eye toward the reliability concerns that are inherent in tribal convic-
tions where an indigent defendant was convicted and imprisoned without
the “guiding hand of counsel.” Gideon shows that the Sixth Amendment
and the integrity of our criminal justice system require an adversarial pro-
cess that is both meaningful and balanced.155 Gideon and Scott together
stand for the proposition that the parties to an adversarial system are not on
147. Cavanaugh, 643 F.3d at 604–605; Shavanaux, 647 F.3d at 998; Spotted Eagle, 71 P.3d at 1244.
148. Cavanaugh, 643 F.3d at 604; Shavanaux, 647 F.3d at 998; Spotted Eagle, 71 P.3d at 1245.
149. Cavanaugh, 643 F.3d at 604; Shavanaux, 647 F.3d at 998; Spotted Eagle, 71 P.3d at 1245.
150. Gideon, 372 U.S. at 345.
151. Newton, supra note 52, at 518. R
152. Id. at 520.
153. Cavanaugh, 643 F.3d at 604.
154. Id.
155. Gideon, 372 U.S. at 344.
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equal footing when an uncounseled defendant is convicted and impris-
oned.156 In Alabama v. Shelton,157 the Court explained the Sixth Amend-
ment does not permit the incarceration of a defendant who was deprived of
counsel at trial since his conviction has “never been subjected to the cruci-
ble of meaningful adversarial testing.”158 Although uncounseled tribal con-
victions resulting in imprisonment are technically valid at inception, the
Ninth Circuit was correct to extend their analysis in Ant to include concerns
for reliability when using these convictions in subsequent prosecution. By
doing so, the Ninth Circuit ensured that the balance of the adversarial jus-
tice system in Ant was not misaligned with the Court’s decision in Gideon.
2. Bryant May Indirectly Undermine Tribal Sovereignty
By disallowing the subsequent use of valid tribal convictions, Bryant is
open to criticism that it indirectly violates the sovereignty of tribal courts.
The majority opinion in Bryant did not consider tribal court sovereignty.159
Only Judge Watford’s concurrence discusses how Bryant affects tribal sov-
ereignty.160 To Judge Watford, suppressing the use of valid tribal convic-
tions in state or federal court seemed to undermine tribal court integrity.161
Similarly, the Montana Supreme Court in State v. Spotted Eagle determined
that to disregard a valid tribal conviction based on Sixth Amendment con-
cerns would “indirectly undermine the sovereignty of [Montana’s tribes]”
and would “imply that Montana only recognizes [a tribe’s] right to self-
government until it conflicts with Montana law.”162
When contemplating how Bryant may indirectly undermine tribal
court sovereignty, it is important to note that the Northern Cheyenne Tribal
Court afforded Michael Bryant all the protections necessary under ICRA
during his two prior domestic assault convictions.163 The Bryant court nev-
ertheless labeled these convictions as constitutionally infirm for use in a
subsequent state or federal prosecution.164 Because Bryant’s tribal court
convictions were valid under ICRA, it is not a stretch to conclude that the
Bryant court viewed the Northern Cheyenne Tribal Court’s process of es-
tablishing guilt as not sufficiently exacting absent full Sixth Amendment
protection. By not validating Bryant’s tribal convictions, Bryant risks mark-
156. Id.; Scott, 440 U.S. at 373–374.
157. 535 U.S. 654 (2002).
158. Id. at 667.
159. Bryant, 769 F.3d at 673.
160. Id. at 679–681 (Watford, J., concurring).
161. Id. at 680.
162. Spotted Eagle, 71 P.3d at 1245.
163. Opening Brief of Defendant-Appellant, supra note 22, at *8.
164. Bryant, 769 F.3d at 676–677.
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ing such convictions as illegitimate and inferior to those obtained in state
and federal courts.
While acknowledging that Bryant may indirectly undermine the sover-
eignty of the tribes, there are reasons that may support the Bryant court’s
decision to focus on preserving the Bryant’s constitutional rights. First, the
Bryant court did not question the validity of Bryant’s tribal convictions or
the internal workings of tribal courts. Rather, the court evaluated whether
Bryant’s convictions satisfy the Sixth Amendment requirement for subse-
quent use in state or federal forums where the Constitution—not ICRA—
governs the rights of a defendant.165
Second, the Bryant decision does not impose upon tribal courts any
burdens beyond ICRA. As the Eighth Circuit in Cavanaugh stated, “Pre-
cluding the use of an uncounseled tribal conviction in federal court would
in no manner restrict a tribe’s own use of that conviction; it would simply
restrict a federal court’s ability to impose additional punishment at a later
date in reliance on that earlier conviction.”166 Contrary to the Montana Su-
preme Court’s assertion in Spotted Eagle, precluding the use of uncoun-
seled tribal convictions in state and federal courts will not impose upon
tribal courts the “insurmountable financial burden”167 of providing counsel
to all indigent defendants in accordance with the Sixth Amendment. After
Bryant, tribal courts still need only comply with ICRA to issue valid tribal
convictions, meaning tribes must afford indigent defendants a right to coun-
sel equal to the Sixth Amendment right only when imposing a term of im-
prisonment greater that one year.168
Lastly, Bryant does not preclude the subsequent use of all valid tribal
convictions. A conviction obtained in tribal court where an indigent defen-
dant was afforded a right to counsel equal to the Sixth Amendment may still
be used in state and federal prosecutions.169 Also, under the Court’s holding
in Nichols, uncounseled tribal convictions that did not result in imprison-
ment are theoretically valid for subsequent use in state and federal prosecu-
tions.170
3. Bryant Did Not Address Equal Protection
The Bryant court did not address whether § 117 violates the Fifth
Amendment’s guarantee of equal protection.171 The Bryant court explained
165. Id. at 673.
166. Cavanaugh, 643 F.3d at 605.
167. Spotted Eagle, 71 P.3d at 1245.
168. 25 U.S.C. § 1302(c).
169. Bryant, 769 F.3d at 673.
170. Nichols, 511 U.S. at 748–749.
171. Bryant, 769 F.3d at 679 n.7.
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in a footnote stating that it need not address the Bryant’s equal protection
argument given the result reached.172 It was Bryant’s argument that, in ad-
dition to a Sixth Amendment violation, using his uncounseled tribal convic-
tions to establish guilt under § 117 violates the Fifth Amendment’s guaran-
tee of equal protection because only Indians are subject to prosecution
based on prior convictions that do not comport with the Sixth Amend-
ment.173 Bryant argued that “Congress has singled out Indian defendants
who are already disadvantaged by the lack of appointed counsel in the first
place and then subjected them to enhanced penalties in federal court outside
of those tribal governments.”174
Had the Bryant court addressed the equal protection issue, Bryant’s
argument would certainly have failed. The Court has repeatedly recognized
“Indian” status not as a racial classification, but a political one.175 In
Worcester v. Georgia,176 one of the Court’s landmark cases on tribal self-
governance, Chief Justice John Marshall described Indian nations as “dis-
tinct, independent political communities, retaining their original natural
rights.”177 Since Worcester, the Court has maintained “federal legislation
with respect to Indian tribes, although relating to Indians as such, is not
based upon impermissible racial classifications.”178 Because “Indian” status
is treated as a political classification, any differential treatment by a federal
statute is said to be a result of an Indian’s voluntary association with his or
her tribe.179 This results in courts applying the rational basis test to statutes
like § 117, rather than a stricter race-based level of scrutiny.180 Both the
Eighth Circuit in Cavanaugh and the Tenth Circuit in Shavanaux held that
§ 117 did not violate the Fifth Amendment’s guarantee of equal protec-
tion.181 These circuit courts found that protecting Indian women was un-
questionably a legitimate government interest.182 Had the Bryant court de-
cided this issue, it likely would have reached a similar conclusion.
172. Id.
173. Opening Brief of Defendant-Appellant, supra note 22, at *8–10.
174. Id. at *26.
175. Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 553 n.24 (1974).
176. 31 U.S. 515 (1832).
177. Id. at 519.
178. United States v. Antelope, 430 U.S. 641, 645 (1977).
179. Shavanaux, 647 F.3d at 1002.
180. Cavanaugh, 643 F.3d at 606.
181. Id. at 605–606; Shavanaux, 647 F.3d at 1002.
182. Shavanaux, 647 F.3d at 1002.
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V. CONCLUSION
In July of 2015, the Ninth Circuit denied to rehear Bryant en banc.183
In the en banc opinion, the majority bolstered its reasoning for distinguish-
ing Nichols and focusing on the reliability of Bryant’s uncounseled tribal
convictions.184 For now, Bryant and its precedent in United States v. Ant
stand. However, just prior to publication of this article the Supreme Court
granted certiorari to review Bryant in light of the circuit split.185 Previous
petitions to review the Bryant issue were denied in 2012 for the Eighth
Circuit’s Cavanaugh and the Tenth Circuit’s Shavanaux.186 With ICRA’s
one-year gap in equal right to counsel protection187 and § 117’s permissible
use of uncounseled tribal convictions,188 the Bryant issue cannot be ig-
nored. Until the Court settles the Bryant issue, the application of Sixth
Amendment protection will continue to differ amongst defendants of differ-
ing states. For tribes like the Navajo Nation, whose territory spans multiple
states, the circuit split means constitutional rights may differ even amongst
members to the same tribe.189 Given this untenable application of Sixth
Amendment rights, Supreme Court review is overdue.
Upon reviewing Bryant, the Court should follow the Ninth Circuit’s
lead. It should focus on the Gideon-type concerns for reliability rather than
the mere technical validity of uncounseled tribal convictions. To not do so
would elevate form over substance. Consequently, uncounseled tribal con-
victions that resulted in imprisonment should be held as constitutionally
infirm for use in state or federal prosecutions. Though § 117 and its policy
of curbing domestic violence against Indian women is noble, courts cannot
look past the reliability concerns for prior convictions obtained against indi-
gent defendants not afforded counsel in tribal court. To disallow the subse-
quent use of these convictions in state and federal prosecutions is not a call
for skepticism of tribal court judgments, but a recognition that these partic-
ular convictions do not pass the Sixth Amendment filter that should be af-
forded to all citizens brought into state or federal court.
183. Bryant, 792 F.3d at 1042.
184. Id.
185. United States v. Bryant, 84 USLW 3200 (U.S. Dec. 14, 2015).
186. Cavanaugh v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 1542 (2012); Shavanaux v. United States, 132 S. Ct.
1742 (2012).
187. 25 U.S.C. § 1302(c).
188. 18 U.S.C. § 117(a).
189. Bryant, 792 F.3d at 1045 (Owens, J., dissenting).
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